where it was stated:
"And I'm processing film from the day - only from the approximate 3 hours of reprinting procedures, not the counting itself. If you love watching paper being unrolled, you'll love the film. It will also serve as a good sleep aid.
But seriously, there are some interesting facts about the process mixed in."
Some of the scenes in the first film may have been slightly re-arranged, to no effect on the meaning. (Not wanting to subject viewers to the whole thing, I myself got lost in the paper unwinding, while editing. Hope I didn't leave out any good parts.) They still show the long tedium of the entire process of just the reprinting damaged Diebold ballots, showing and explaining everything they were doing to recount witnesses: the board's decision making, according to SoS Memo 7-21, etc. (And I missed when they showed witnesses that they had selected the matching memory cards to the yet-to -be printed tapes.)
The second film below, explains more of what they still had to do - just for the reprint process - again, not the hand count nor the final comparing to official results.
Further, as explained below, this whole closed-circle process of essentially machine to machine, with a lot of human care and counting in between, proves essentially NOTHING about the Diebold machines' actually tabulating the will of the voters!
What a mess that's been set up for us by HAVA, and now continued by Brunner!
What a waste! What false securities in elections meaning the majority will are being set up!
A few of the salient facts you'll find dotted amidst the unwinding VVPAT's, in the films include:
1.When there is a paper change in a Tsx machine, the machine does not record the machine ID on the second and possibly the third paper tape, making it nearly impossible to match up that partial tape with the right memory card/machine ( in case the poll workers forget. Remember, in the field when they get paper jams, and have lines of people, after only 4-5 hours of training weeks before, 1-day poll workers too get overwhelmed.)
2. The GEMS tabulating system cannot generate reports by certain precincts, as is done in recounts, making that necessary isolation process another hour-long manual step for BOE workers.
3. Damaged ballots go from mangled, to one vote not being able to be read- still necessitating the process of reprint.
4. HB3 demanded that the public is not allowed to see the machine serial numbers printed at the top of tape (the first only when there are multiples.) Now what's THAT about?
The only "privacy" such maintains is to keep private "evidence" of all kinds of potential unscrupulous behavior and "fixed" or unfixed (non-repaired) machines.
Even in a small county with only a few machines and few voters, if Sally X, were the only person to cast a vote on a machine, by the time it would get to recount, who would know that the one vote on a paper trail with machine serial number 123456, for instance, was Sally's. There needs to be a way to cross reference the cards and VVPATs, obviously. In Cuyahoga, they matched by card number and polling location printed at the top. It's ORC 3516.18 now.
5. And more...http://www.blogger.com/post-edit.g?blogID=916809716015280485&postID=1918774616179986626#
So get out the caffiene or stress ball ...and learn for yourself - some facts, and how bad it is, for essentially no good reason but false securities.
The board members you see in the videos are (R) Chairman Jeff Hastings, and (D) Sandy McNair, who are trying to follow SoS Memo 07-21. You also see Matt Jaffe, head of the CCBOE Ballot Dept. and Brian Cleary of same. In background are Ed Monroe regional rep for Sec. Brunner; Jane Platten, Director; Pat McDonald Assist. Director, recount observers and others.
For a slicker, quicker view from media, here's WKYC, Channel 3's coverage from the second day.
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