The Recount Re-Trial Was "Continued"

The Prosecutor had filed a motion against a retrial based, from what I understand, on his putting forth that there IS NO new evidence.

The retrial was granted originally, from what I understand, based upon the defense's putting forth that there IS new evidence.

Prosecutor Baxter's motion was acted upon late yesterday. Per that, for today, there was a continuance. At least for today, no recount retrial has officially begun.

Think Ohio Needs More Than 2 Parties on Our '08 Ballot???

OK democracy advocates – it’s time to get moving here.

Even the staunchest Republicans and Democrats must recognize that to have a robust democracy, we must have choices. And most election integrity advocates, and it seems more and more voters not aware that elections take active year-round participation of all of us, are realizing that the future of our country is no longer about simple duality, no longer simple choices or alignments anymore.

On May 21, Secretary of State Brunner put out an important Directive about what we must do to keep more than just the traditional two parties on next year’s Ohio ballot.

Greens, Libertarians, or ??? will not automatically be allowed to be on without our a) creating and getting approved a petition for each party additional to R’s and D’s and b.) getting the required number – over 20,114 of valid signatures by November 26, 2007 to just allow the party to get on the ballot.
Those parties’ candidate’s petitions will then be yet a whole separate matter – a whole separate set of petitions.

Here is the very explanatory Directive 2007-09 - Political Party Access to the Ballot in Ohio. It was in a an image scanned form so I could not cut and paste the text. And because I can't seem to access it again on the SoS site at this time, I provide a link to my saved copy.

Who out there is willing to take up the charge of standing for one (or more) of the more minority parties, and starting a statewide petition campaign. Almost 25,000 signatures- when one considers that we must get enough to end up with the required number of valid signatures, even after mistakes of some some signers and some circulators - by early November makes it NOT TOO SOON TO START NOW.

Secretary Brunner Starts Process of Testing Electronic Voting Systems

http://www.sos.state.oh.us/News/Read.aspx?ID=203

Brunner Seeks Proposals to Test Voting Systems

COLUMBUS, Ohio — Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner on Monday sought proposals from experts to test the capability and security of the voting machines used in Ohio.

According to the Request for Proposals released by Secretary Brunner, system evaluations will examine the technology of the touch-screen and optical scan machines as well as the software. The evaluation will also conduct volume and usability testing on each election system.

The evaluation, expected to begin in mid-summer and to be completed in the fall of this year, advances a top priority of Secretary Brunner's: Improving the integrity of and bolstering public confidence in Ohio's elections. Proposals are due by July 9, the Secretary of State's office said.

The results of the testing process will be used to make improvements in the handling and securing of voting machines before, during and after elections, the Secretary of State's office said.

“This is a vital step to assuring voters that Ohio's elections are safe, reliable and accurate and that the results can be trusted,“ said Brunner, Ohio's top elections official.

“With Ohio's pivotal role in the last presidential election and the likely emphasis that will be placed on our vote in the next, we owe it to our state and the nation to bring in the best experts available to examine these systems,“ said Brunner.

“If problems are detected, we will work to find a solution. We will also gain valuable insight to improve election security procedures to ensure the integrity of our vote,“ Brunner added.

The testing seeks a comprehensive, independent and objective assessment of the risks to election integrity associated with Ohio's voting systems. The three manufacturers of voting systems in Ohio are Election Systems & Software; Diebold Election Systems and Hart InterCivic.

Testing is expected to be complete by Sept. 20, 2007 or as mutually agreed upon by the Secretary of State's office and the experts who are selected, according to the request.

">To view the RFP, click here (PDF).

">To view a county by county map of Ohio's voting systems, click here (PDF).

">To view facts about the EVEREST project and the RFP, click here (PDF).

-30-

Media Contacts:
Patrick Gallaway, Director of Communications, (614) 752-2450
Jeff Ortega, Assistant Director of Communications, Media: (614) 466-0473.

Well I don't know about this. The goals could get very mirky here for they don't start out very clearly, in my opinion.

I don’t understand why we keep avoiding the basics.

• Why we’re not getting systems designers first find out what is needed for fair, accurate, transparent elections, then bring in the computer scientists to decide how these machines pose risks to those basic needs/ thus what needs to be developed.
• Or why we keep starting from the massive security and operational limits of the machines, to see how we might “mitigate” risks – when such mitigations have proved also too costly, only partially reliable (leaving the other parts able to improperly sway elections) and completely impractical to rely upon for the decisions of who will be our next president etc.

I do wish this project great success. But I also wish this office would define/take a clear stance on such things as

• election integrity
• accuracy - ( not as some expert’s mathematical probability, especially not in some audit that takes place after some election, mainly to pacify the people still disgruntled that we still can't see votes being counted; we still can't count them ourselves if we wanted to (we can only look at some long skinny paper tapes that some other secret software told the machines to print something on) - but as accuracy as we all know accuracy)
• transparency – so we all can verify our votes in ways that make sense to human minds, make sure that results make sense, and can watch our votes being counted – not have them announced from some secret software that we’re only told “just counts,”or by some other “experts” who looked at probabilities and mitigations
  
• independent – to stop this burgeoning of computer “experts” and academics eager to build whole new careers, on more billions of our money over this 2002 HAVA fiasco and the impossible-for-fair elections machines it's left us with throughout the nation.
  

We'll be following this one closely to see if it helps or further hinders democracy.....
When will enough be enough? Who will finally say it- ENOUGH!
Let's cut our massive and continuing losses, and get on with teh business of democracy!

The Future Looks Bright - not politically pushed, pulled or stained

Last Monday, at the June 11 board meeting Jane Platten was chosen as the new Director of the CCBOE.
We are fortunate. This was a decision made with managerial wisdom for the voters of this county and without bending to past political pressure, and future political hopes of a few.
Platten has demonstrated herself bright, caring, and deeply capable as a manager who understands the purpose of elections.

The last paragraphs of last Sunday’s PD article says it all. And knowing Platten it is far from a fake statement. She truly understands:

She will deal with budgets, polling issues and computers. With each issue, she will make an addition to her to-do lists on her wall or fire off late-night e-mails to her staff. She said she will manage the office with her staff's input, as well as the community's.

And it's all done for one reason:

"It's so that people like my mom and dad can go to vote with confidence and know that the privilege of voting will be handled correctly. . . . To many people, voting is sacred."

Here is Last Tuesday’s PD article by Joan Mazzolini about Platten’s being chosen.
http://www.cleveland.com/plaindealer/stories/index.ssf?/base/cuyahoga/11

Interim election director stays
New Board of Elections votes, 3-1, for Jane Platten
Tuesday, June 12, 2007
Joan Mazzolini
Plain Dealer Reporter
The Cuyahoga County Board of Elections members surprised many by appointing their interim director to
the permanent position Monday.
Jane Platten, 39, started at the board in March 2004 as head of administrative services, includ ing human
re sources, pur chasing and community out reach. But last year, she had been tapped to turn around poll
worker recruitment and training for the November election.
"I look forward to continuing my work as director of the Board of Elections," Platten said after the meeting.
"The work at hand is one of an 'us proposition' that involves the whole community.
"I understand that to be accountable we need strong partnerships with the secretary of state, the county
commissioners, county prosecutor and, ultimately, the voters," she said. The board is still under
administrative oversight by the Ohio secretary of state's office.
During the May 2006 primary, hundreds of poll workers were no-shows and hundreds more complained of
poor training that left them ill-prepared to set up the new touch-screen voting machines used countywide
for the first time. Hundreds of polling locations opened late.
Even with her success in November, and the successful May primary she conducted recently, her
appointment came as a surprise to many.
The board's 3-1 vote for Platten highlighted some behind-the-scenes disagreement.
While board members Inajo Davis Chappell, Eben "Sandy" McNair and Rob Frost voted for Platten, Jeff
Hastings voted against.
After the meeting, Hastings said "Billy Denihan" had been his first choice, though he praised Platten and
said he is convinced she will do an excellent job. He pledged to do everything he can to help her succeed.
Platten is the fourth director of the board since 2000. Her predecessors, Bill Wilkins, Tom Jelepis and
Michael Vu, all left under controversial circumstances.
William Denihan, 69, had been the front-runner initially after applying for the position under the former
board.
But appointing a new director stalled when Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner asked the four board
members to resign earlier this year. The former director and deputy director had just been forced out of
their jobs by the board because of the disastrous May 2006 primary, despite the successful November
election.
Platten, who was asked to serve as interim director during the search, did not apply for the position at first.
Platten became interim director in March.
But she put her name in after the new board went against the advice of the search committee and began
accepting new applicants.
Platten's official salary was not determined at Monday's meeting. The position's salary was advertised as
up to $120,000.
Board members said they are eager to move toward finding a deputy director.
"Platten will be significantly involved in that search," Hastings said.
To reach this Plain Dealer reporter:
jmazzolini@plaind.com, 216-999-4563
© 2007 The Plain Dealer
© 2007 cleveland.com All Rights Reserved.

And here is the link to the PD Sunday feature about our new CCBOE Director.
http://www.cleveland.com/plaindealer/stories/index.ssf?/base/news/1182069125259600.xml&coll=2
New elections chief focuses on lists and plans
Sunday, June 17, 2007
John Caniglia
Plain Dealer Reporter

Here also is the link to the PD editorial
http://www.cleveland.com/plaindealer/stories/index.ssf?/base/opinion/1181724164108010.xml&coll=2
reminding of how difficult (and dangerous) Platten’s new position can be. Four CCBOE Directors since 2000.

But lucky for us and her, none of those people came in with the experience, talent and drive behind them that Platten has. None of them came in with such strong support of so many agencies from the Secretary of State on down; and none came in with the also majorly important ingredient- a majority of a board so determined and willing to get citizens’ elections right, far more than political deal-making (…at least not yet, and hopefully not at all.)

I will be posting film of Platten’s last Wednesday’s swearing in by next week.

As example of just one of the tasks before Platten and the board is demonstrated by this list of staff positions on the CCBOE web site. There are a number of key slots to fill well, as Platten continues to build and support currently committed staff members:

Director	Jane Platten
Deputy Director
Elections Coordinator
Administrator of Community Outreach and Administrative Services

And Vu AGAIN- A Must Read - San Diego Activists for Democracy Remain Outraged

Fox 6 News in San Diego has been following the voter outrage in San Diego caused by the hiring of Michael Vu.
In my own just getting back to blogging after some time off here, I must begin by catching up on the late May activist activities there, and the (unprecedented - for Cleveland) wonderful media coverage Vu's questionable background is duly receiving.

Paul Lehto, nationally well known elections integrity lawyer and activist there , along with attorney Ken Simpkins sent me these links.
They are truly worth a good look.
Start here: ( Just goes to show you how a little documenting and a lot of working together nationwide can can help us help our country's democracy.) This, "Questionable Background" went up on May 21, 2007:
http://www.fox6.com/mediacenter/local.aspx?videoid=315523@video.fox6.com

Then still listed as a "hot topic"on May 23, the "Voter Outrage" video went up:
http://www.fox6.com/mediacenter/local.aspx?videoid=315953@video.fox6.com

Then more printed content went up on their site:
http://www.fox6.com/news/local/story.aspx?content_id=3def0250-dd22-4c12-ae5d-ded474dfa8a7

Lehto and Simpkins, so-founders of an organization named Psephos, also held a news conference.
Lehto wrote in an email:

A gift from Psephos to Interim Registrar Michelle Townsend, Registrar-Appoint Deborah Seiler, Asst. Registrar-Appoint Michael Vu, and, most importantly, a gift to Diebold:

We Present to you, this 10 minute feature expose' on FOX TV in San Diego, to honor your corruption of the recounts in the 2004 presidential election, to give tribute to your secret vote counting software, to indict the entire electoral process in Ohio, to indict the entire electoral process in San Diego, to remember that thousands did not receive their ballots in Ohio, to condemn the loss of voter registrations, and to make damn sure that Judge Corrigan's comments (the trial judge in the felony convictions in the Ohio recount rigging in the 2004 presidential elections) are remembered and available on video:

On video, Judge Corrigan says to the convicted Ohio election officials: "Protecting other people, I don't know, it seems unlikely that your superiors didn't know." ---Judge Peter Corrigan

Then there is (not yet available on webstream) a five minute discussion interview that aired live in which Psephos pointed out that Vu was the superior, where Psephos attorney and co-founder Ken Simpkins pointed to the lack of accountability of these appointed election vendor apologists, and denounced the lack of checks and balances and lack of citizen control over elections. Consistent with earlier coverage of the San Diego Union Tribune quoting Psephos' Paul Lehto, Deborah Seiler's 12 years with Diebold and Sequoia were acknowledged for her skills as "one of the nation's foremost apologists for electronic secret vote counting." Ken rocked!

We also had a packed Supervisors in a mid-morning meeting with numerous public comments taking on the supervisors for approving secret vote counting, buying millions more in machines the day before this public comment, and being unresponsive to polls stating that over 80% of San Diegans want a transparent voting system. Some citizens were getting so upset two got ejected from the room, but each public comment in favor of democracy was greeted with enthusiastic applause, and even a comment by a Supervisor about the patriotic war in Iraq got greeted by widespread boos and hisses. Many local citizens and activists attended and a half dozen or more made comments.

Our press conference at 1030 was also well attended by TV and print media. Here's the Fox News link for the San Diego story (first half of it)

http://www.fox6.com/news/local/story.aspx?content_id=3def0250-dd22-4c12-ae5d-ded474dfa8a7

or go to www.fox6.com and choose the link to today's feature story QUESTIONABLE BACKGROUND.

A special salute to Ohio activists like Adele Eisner, and Kathleen Wynne who got critical video for the Cuyahoga case, and others who played key roles in developing the Ohio evidence against Vu.

Vu's record is now following him wherever he goes, as it should. Off the record, media is calling the whole thing "sordid."

You could say that the weather is San Diego is HOT. When the election PR department and officials refuse to respond to repeated calls for comment, they are IN HIDING.

But politicians should know that when it comes to elections, they can Run for office, but they can't Hide. They can't hide the vote counting -- nor can they hide from the cameras in San Diego either.

Paul Lehto, Co-founder, Psephos (SEA-foss)

Ken Simpkins, Co-founder, Psephos

Linda Poniktera, Co-founder, Psephos

Then there are the stories in the San Diego North County Times like this:
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/05/23/news/top_stories/29_04_175_22_07.txt

Protesters criticize county elections hirings
By: GIG CONAUGHTON - Staff Writer
May 23, 2007
SAN DIEGO -- Tuesday's county Board of Supervisors meeting drew a restive crowd, with two people ejected, while dozens of other electronic voting opponents protested recent hirings for the county's elections department.

Between 40 and 50 people showed up at the board meeting to protest the county's recent decisions to hire Deborah Seiler and Michael Vu as the county's top two elections officials, registrar and assistant registrar of voters.

The protests also included sharp criticisms of electronic voting in general, and devolved into shouts from audience members, rebukes from supervisors, and a declaration from county Chief Administrative Officer Walt Ekard that Seiler, Vu and electronic voting were here to stay.

Seiler, who most recently served as the assistant registrar of voters in Solano County, also worked as a sales representative with Ohio-based Diebold Elections Systems, and was directly involved in the company's sale of 10,200 "touch screen" election machines to San Diego County.

Protesters said Seiler had a conflict of interest because as a Diebold employee, she benefited financially from the sale of the machines to the county, and because she, as a former Diebold employee, supported a system that could rig elections.

Vu, meanwhile, resigned in February as executive director of Ohio's Cuyahoga County election board, where two elections workers were convicted of rigging a 2004 presidential election recount.

Protesters said Vu's resignation and the problems in Cuyahoga showed he was incompetent.

Vu could not be reached for comment Tuesday.

Seiler, who will take over as county registrar June 4, said in a phone interview after Tuesday's protest that she hoped people would consider her entire elections career when judging her.

The 57-year-old Seiler's elections experience started in the 1970s, and she said it demonstrated a "clear dedication to voters and the process of elections administration."

Among other jobs, she spent seven years with the California secretary of state's office, eventually becoming assistant to the secretary of state for elections and political reform. She also served as a commissioner for California's Fair Political Practices Commission, worked in the private sector with Diebold and a rival, Sequoia Pacific Systems, and as an elections officer in Solano County.

Seiler said she believed that the fact she was familiar with three different types of electronic voting systems added to her elections experience.

"I'm not beholden to any of those companies," Seiler said.

Ken Simpkins, leader of a recently created local elections watchdog group, opened Tuesday's comments, telling supervisors that San Diego County had become the "laughingstock for the country for election integrity" by hiring Seiler and Vu.

Chief Administrative Officer Ekard -- who has publicly defended his hirings of Seiler and Vu, and who previously characterized many anti-electronic voting critics as "conspiracy theorists" intent on undermining public confidence in elections -- immediately responded to the criticisms.

Ekard said election integrity was "paramount" to him, county workers and supervisors, called electronic voting criticism "tired arguments," and defended Seiler and Vu, calling them honorable people with decades of elections experience who would ensure the integrity of the county's elections.

At a break in the meeting, Simpkins said that he and other electronic-voting opponents believe that the machines can be rigged to register "secret votes" -- electronically tabulating a vote for a candidate the voter did not select while printing out the name of the voter's chosen candidate on the printed vote copy that was designed to prevent fraud.

"Mr. Ekard and his board are overseeing the implementation of a system of secret vote counting in San Diego," Simpkins alleged. "It cannot be an accident that the most controversial elections officials in the country... are here in San Diego."

Members of the audience broke into applause at the end of Simpkins' and subsequent protesters' comments, a demonstration that county officials routinely ask audience members not to do. However, board Chairman Ron Roberts chose not to admonish the audience until it was the county's turn to speak in response.

Ekard told the audience he supported the two new election officials.

"I understand that there are those of you who disagree with my hires," Ekard said. "I have heard you. I have listened to you. I disagree with you, and that's it. They will be on staff to ensure ..."

At that moment, a woman in the audience shouted out, challenging Ekard.

Roberts stopped the proceedings, and asked the woman to leave, saying that county officials had politely listened to the protesters.

But then, another woman, Becky Hostetter, angrily shouted back at Roberts that county officials had indeed interrupted the public speakers, a charge that seemed not to be true unless she referred to Roberts' telling speakers when their two-minute time limits were up.

Roberts then told Hostetter to leave, which prompted her to yell even louder as she retreated.

"What you're doing is wrong," Hostetter shouted, her voice increasing in volume as she continued. "You're subverting democracy -- and we won't have it!"

Ekard again tried to finish. Crowd members once again jeered, and Supervisor Pam Slater-Price lashed out.

"Excuse me please," Slater-Price said. "During the time you were speaking, we did not boo, hiss, catcall or laugh. That is very rude and totally unacceptable behavior."

Board members, meanwhile, listened only to five of the public speakers at the beginning of the meeting, choosing to trail the remainder until the end of the meeting, which concluded without incident.

Meanwhile, at the break, the audience members held a planned demonstration outside, holding up placards such as "Stop ignoring the voters of San Diego County," and "Seiler and Vu = sleaze X 2." One woman, wearing a pink "Impeach Bush and Cheney" T-shirt and a wolf mask, carried a poster-sized sign emblazoned with a quote attributed to deceased journalism icon Edward R. Murrow, "A nation of sheep soon begets a government of wolves."

Although the county of San Diego ran a relatively problem-free set of elections in November 2006 with its electronic voting machines, and most voters seemed to like the machines, electronic voting has not outgrown controversy that suggests that they could be rigged to throw elections.

California Secretary of State Debra Bowen, herself an electronic voting critic, has ordered a "top to bottom" $1.8 million retesting of all California electronic voting systems.

Bowen said she hoped the review could be finished by August, and that electronic systems could be decertified if they prove vulnerable to tampering.

Meanwhile, Simpkins' watchdog group has filed a complaint with Bowen's office alleging that county officials committed several crimes and wrongdoing during last November's elections.

County officials have responded to queries from Bowen's office, but no determinations have been made.

-- Contact staff writer Gig Conaughton at (760) 739-6696 or gconaughton@nctimes.com

Or this:
http://www.nctimes.com/articles/2007/06/07/news/top_stories/1_03_326_6_07.txt

County's registrar Deborah Seiler says she hopes to win over critics
By: GIG CONAUGHTON - Staff Writer

SAN DIEGO -- New Registrar of Voters Deborah Seiler said Wednesday that she wants people to know she's committed to serving voters, and that she hopes to win over critics who say she never should have been hired by the county.

Sitting in her unadorned office, Seiler, 57, said that she and county officials knew her appointment would be controversial -- because she had spent two years working for Ohio-based Diebold Election Systems and was part of a marketing team that helped sell 10,200 electronic voting machines to San Diego County.

Those critics have said Seiler's background represents a conflict of interest.

But Seiler rejected that allegation Wednesday -- as well as suggestions that electronic voting machines are inherently dangerous because they can be rigged -- in her first official batch of interviews as registrar. She said she worked for two years with Diebold in a 30-year elections career that included 11 years with the secretary of state's office in Sacramento, and, most recently, three years as registrar in Solano County.

"There is no conflict of interest -- legal or ethical; I have no financial ties to any company," she said.

Elections officials have used computers to help count votes for 40 years, Seiler said, long before recent moves to "touch screen" and other electronic machines created controversy.

For example, she said, the old punch cards that people used for decades were actually counted by computers that "read" the holes.

Seiler said she was not saying that electronic machines could "never" be rigged, or that elections officials shouldn't be careful with their use. But people have been sounding alarms that computers were not safe to count votes for decades, she said, and those alarms have not become reality.

"I think that's good context for voters," she said.

Meanwhile, Seiler said she plans to try to talk to a few local groups who have loudly criticized electronic voting -- at protests such as a recent county supervisors meeting that saw two people ejected.

"As registrar, if there's even a small contingent of people who are concerned, then I'm concerned," she said. "I want people to trust the system. Or I want people to at least understand the system."

Seiler said the county's own touch screens performed without a hitch Tuesday in a special election in Vista for residents to decide whether to allow the city to adopt a charter.

However, Seiler -- and counties across California -- still do not know if they'll be able to use their electronic systems in the state's February presidential primary elections.

California Secretary of State Debra Bowen announced last month that she plans to review all the existing systems in an investigation that will include computer hacking "penetration teams," and that the machines could be decertified.

Seiler said Wednesday that she and county officials are worried because Bowen's review has created uncertainty that could make pulling off three big elections in 2008 -- February's presidential primary, a local June primary, and November's presidential election -- more difficult to pull off.

Elections officials say that primary elections are often the most difficult to coordinate because ballots -- which must be printed in four languages -- must also be printed in several different types because voters in primaries can only vote only for their respective party's races.

Seiler said she doubts that Bowen can actually conduct a "top to bottom" review in the next two months, which could leave county rushing to find backup options by February's primary.

Seiler said that Bowen has stated that the review would be done using 2002 federal guidelines that were 6 inches thick.

"It takes the (federal elections agencies) eight to nine months to go through hundreds of thousands of lines of source code; these people (Bowen) are going to do it in three weeks?" Seiler said.

Seiler also questioned Bowen's use of computer hackers to test the safety of electronic machines. A number of government, academic and private computer groups have hacked into existing systems in laboratory settings, showing vulnerability and arguing the machines could possibly "throw" elections.

But Seiler, as other elections officials have said in the past, said the laboratory tests lack real-world safeguards. For one thing, she said, the laboratory hackers would be given the "secret" source code for the machines.

"If you give a burglar the keys to your house and the floor plan, they're probably going to get in," she said.

However, Seiler and other county officials said their biggest worry is that Bowen's review could throw electronic machines into a sort of limbo that could leave counties struggling to figure out how to run the impending elections. For example, she said, the Bowen review could leave electronic voting machines certified -- legal for use -- but attach security conditions that would make them too expensive for counties to use.

In that case, counties could go back to using paper ballots. But, Seiler said, federal laws that took effect in 2006 say elections officials can't make disabled persons -- such as the blind -- use paper ballots. She said that's because someone would have to help them fill them out, and they would not be secret ballots.

If that happened, Seiler said, counties could be scrambling to find some alternative -- not electronic and not paper -- to use.

Seiler also said she was comfortable with the county's decision to hire another controversial elections official, Michael Vu, as assistant registrar.

Vu resigned in February as executive director of Ohio's Cuyahoga County election board, where two elections workers were convicted of rigging a 2004 presidential election recount. Cuyahoga county also made news in November 2006 when electronic voting problems prompted a federal court to order 16 polling stations to stay open more than 90 minutes after the 7:30 p.m. closing time. Despite the problems, Vu was praised by other elections officials for his work, and he said he decided to resign because he felt the Cuyahoga elections board wanted new leadership.

Seiler said she saw no problems with the county hiring Vu -- who was hired before Seiler.

"He went to court, there was all this media attention, and he was under intense scrutiny," Seiler said of Vu's relation to the convicted workers. "If there had been something there, I think they would have found it -- or indicted him."

-- Contact staff writer Gig Conaughton at (760) 739-6696 or gconaughton@nctimes.com.

There they all are now sounding somewhat like an uninformed or defensive replay of the crazy-making days of Cuyahoga. Even the North County Times editors have not put in the time to see that going back to paper ballots for elections would be the most courageous, futuristic jump for democracy made in years. Instead in their non-researched, non-understanding fog of blindly accepting electronics as some magical, wiz-bang answers to all, they call activists "regressive.
And there are all the players - still trying to perjoratively sling the term “conspiracy theorist” against those who’ve actually not rested until the real conspiracies have been exposed over the past few years, and against those who just want proven facts brought to light.
Still trying to scare people from having real elections with verifiable election results by trying to make the majority assume that current DRE’s, especially Diebold’s, are the only solution for handicapped access, when they are definitely not.
Still trying to convince people that because the vendor robber-barons and the politicians who loved them ( and their ability to undetectably manipulate elections) have gotten away with shoving this equipment down the throats of the electorate nationwide– on our multi-billions – and with not even enough time or information for the right questions to be thought to be asked by legislators approving HAVA , let alone the right answers being demanded – that now, it would somehow be foolish or wasteful to not only cut our continuing huge financial outlays to these same companies, but to take back our elections from the few profit guzzling, private companies who now control everything about them – including the results, through their secret software.

And how nice of Seiler to want Diebold critics to at least “understand” the equipment. Seiler’s problem is, however, that we are not without the facts any longer - as many election officials were when she was first passing this junk off to them. We DO UNDERSTAND, and that’s why we know the machines are unacceptable, as is her being in that conflict of interest position, and Vu’s being an election official anywhere after his demonstrated lack of competence and integrity here in Cuyahoga.

Funny how Mr’s. Eckard, Haas et al. want us to believe that Vu took criticism here ( and I really DO wonder which Cuyahoga election officials praised him, besides his order giver, Mr. Bennett) because of Cuyahoga’s size in Ohio.

But funny how the Cuyahoga elections board - without Vu (and the previous board)- is turning into a model of respect, efficiency, working together and human care – no protesting need be thought about, let alone needed.

Funny how more and more information is coming out here about just how incompetent and without integrity Mr. Vu was when he was here in Cuyahoga.

So the two big questions regarding Vu remain:
Will he be called back to finally face the charges that are due to him?
And will San Diego ever let him talk to the media ever again?
(They haven't so far....)

Tidbits from Today's Second BOE Meeting with the New Board

No time right now to fill you in completely, but at some highlights from today's BOE meeting:

• Platten was phenomenal. So organized and forthcoming about necessary information
• She and staff have decided on a plan to notify voters whose provisional ballots were rejected, giving them the opportunity to by law, contest those rejections, and bring in proof of ID within 81 days and have the election results amended. This will begin to finally update the unknown "lost" number of voter registrations Vu revealed in the certification meeting last November, creating still unknown numbers improperly forced into provisionals because they're not in the poll books, then have those provisionals rejected - without the voters awareness, thus, ready to start the whole process again in the next election.
• Cuyahoga's main Diebold GEMS server crashed on May 4 before May's election. They used the back up server as the main one, and Sec. Brunner's office lent them another one for back-up. Brunner's office needs theirs back, and has been in conversation with Diebold with Platten to "urge" them into fixing the server, which they don't seem at all urgent to do.
  They have no idea of an election schedule they are supposed to be serving. (Cuyahoga has another election in Euclid coming up in July.) They sent the server to Texas, and will now send it to Vancouver Canada - ahem.... to "find out what's wrong." Presently they skirt the issue of costs for all this fixing and playing around... We know who they'll say needs to pay for all this "play."
  When I get the video posted of Mike Rich, the Diebold engineer's "explanations," Black Box Voting friends for sure, will have more gasps of amazement.
  The Board it appeared saw right through them too. Not completely pleased. But the ever present, ever quiet Diebold lawyer sat there again.. right behind the two reps Mike and the our "new Jessica Hiner"who showed up for this show.
• The Board also certified May's election. I'll get those numbers up soon.
• Also they will hold an executive session on June 6 to review the search committee's recommendations for the CCBOE's new Director and Deputy. They received 50 more applications in the extension period for this search. A new director is coming soon. Which party? Thus who of the opposite party will be the new permanent Chair of the Board.
  The current interim arrangement of Platten and Hastings seems like it could work out excellently on a permanent basis. This could, however still get interesting...

And today the board retired to executive session to discuss three items - which they actually announced as they're supposed to do (what a difference from Vu-Bennett)
instances of double voting - and possible legal consequences. We'll see if those three separate people were just confused, (other languaged, etc.) as have most of the very few past double voting people.
AND
GRAND JURY SUBPOENAS!

DOES THIS MEAN THAT BAXTER IS, IN FACT, STILL INVESTIGATING VU???? GLORY BE!
(See http://citizensboe.blogspot.com/2007/05/two-tidbits-from-cleveland-scene-mag.html)

Up to his Old Tricks Already

Michael Vu (back to camera) goes out of his way to make a special stop at the back of the room
as he leaves the November 7,2006 Cuyahoga election day board meeting,
to greet and schmooz Diebold cousin (same last name, in coat)
and his "Diebold partners"-Mark ("our machines are 100% reliable & it's all someone else's fault") Radke, to left, and Jessica ( "I don't know the answer to that, but I know it'll be another $500,000") Hiner, who after pushing our $15M in sales recently got a promotion to Diebold Training Director.

This one's too good to have buried in comments.

On May 20, Duncan from San Diego wrote:

"Todays edition of the North County Times added an even greater helping of disdain on the residents. Buried in a budget review, it was revealed that the County will be purchasing 200 more of the Diebold machines. This when the budget shortfalls will force the county to cut back services. Fifty positions at the Child Protection Office will be left vacant, yet the Registrars Office budget will increase by ten million dollars in order to purchase more Diebolds. One can only hope that Seiler and Hass split the sales commision equitably."

No, Duncan, you left out your man Vu - with maybe a bit of a finder's fee for Townsend who hired him...

This is the end of my reply to San Diego lawyer acivist Ken Simpkins when I sent him some requested links on Vu.

Two other areas I strongly suggest you pursue (as you may get somewhere outside of Cuyahoga politics) are:

1. Call the special prosecutor from the recount rigging case here (some links also in the first post)- Kevin Baxter - 419-627-7719.
He's supposed to be continuing the investigation of that '04 rigging and the many "irregularities" of '06 elections, including not following federal court orders. But given this county, I don't know the deals that have been made....

I know Baxter knows of Vu's involvement...ie that Vu should have been indicted instead of those women. Why he didn't indict him, I don't know - probably Bennett's cover ( but Bennett has lost power.) Thus, don't know how far, or if any such investigation might proceed. Probably the women will get off on some kind of stupid appeal, and Vu (and Bennett, also culpable) - the real felons - will be able to skip away scot-free.
I also have documents that show that what those women did and are sentenced to prison for, they did at least with Vu's full knowledge which he later tried to cover up.


2. And (as mentioned in the post) - Vu's federal offense of having his '03 Cuyahoga arrival voting registration fudged - a federal offense - that allowed him to become Director here before his 30 days Ohio residency - also a state offense.

That would be one way to get rid of him there- Bring him back to Cuyahoga for trial and his own deserved prison sentences - for these and other election laws he's broken.

What you do about Deborah the Diebold Rep, and those who want her there - for easy election fixing and maybe good financial kickbacks from Diebold for lots more $Millions of senseless sales - I don't know.
But first hang on to your county's pocket books, get a handle on those making the appropriations - and start keeping a running total yourself of the thousands then millions of dollars (probably attempted to be hidden) that go to Diebold for such things as copies of training posters, maintenance of maintenance that fell apart, 25 tech people when one would have sufficed, licensing and more maintenance of maintenance fees- AND don't let them buy the Diebold registration system - which even they cannot make work except with ongoing hundreds of extra hours by elections staff, but can be tied in with caging systems - etc.

Good luck on your good work.

It'll be a good thing to keep comparing notes with Cuyahoga. It seems that Vu's not wise enough to change his tactics.

Here are exerpts from May 20 North County Times article Duncan talked about above:

Sheriff's woes, electronic voting, pests included in county budget

By: GIG CONAUGHTON - Staff Writer

SAN DIEGO -- The Sheriff's Department is still having a hard time finding new deputies. Construction has dried up in the unincorporated areas of the county. A freeze has been lifted for local prosecutors. Electronic voting appears to be here to stay. And destructive insects could have a tougher time getting into San Diego County in the coming year.
...
But the increase is not modest across the board. Some programs and areas will get little in the way of increases, or will receive less money than last year. Other services are getting boosts much larger than 7.1 percent.
.....
Also likely to get an increase is the county's fund for voting machines.

Electronic voting machines have stirred some controversy with a minority of election watchers. But the San Diego County registrar of voters office is expecting its budget to jump from $15.53 million to $25.26 million, in part because the county intends to buy more electronic voting machines.

The county agreed to buy 10,200 Diebold TSX "touch screen" voting machines for $31 million in 2003, and used those machines in November's elections.

However, Mikel Haas, director of the county's Community Services Group that oversees the registrar's office, said the county plans to buy an additional 2,000 machines for $5.4 million before February's presidential primary because some voters had to wait in line to cast ballots in November.

"When we used them in November, for the most part you could take a look at rush hour and see we needed more units," he said.

Election Deception - HR811- A "Must See & Heed"

I know these women. They are absolutely right - not because I know them, but because for years they have done all the homework, have read all the research with open minds - they have the facts, and they are not going to let themselves get distracted from getting this nation fair elections, that are transparent to citizen oversight, just because our elections belong to US! and as ours, to prevent insider election stealing, an endemic issue as old as human fear and greed, that even the founders of this nation knew to warn against.
WATCH AND LISTEN

Secretary of State Brunner's Office "Retesting" E-Voting Devices

As mentioned in a previous post, ( #5-f) Secretary of State Brunner is in the midst of plans to test the Ohio's e-voting devices over this Summer, and aims to have a report out by September. As also stated there, California Secretary of State Bowen is doing the same thing for that state, saying she is testing the electronic systems "from top to bottom."
The California plans were somewhat outlined in a 5/10 North County Times- San Diego article linked in that post.
It states:

Secretary of State Debra Bowen said Thursday that computer experts hired by her office will take up Sequoia Voting Systems' equipment and software next week, along with those of two other vendors. Sequoia makes the Edge II terminals that Riverside County voters encounter at polls and the software that the county uses to manage elections and tabulate ballots.

Bowen said in March that she would conduct a "top-to-bottom" review of the voting systems used in California's 58 counties, focusing on their security, reliability and compliance with federal and state election laws. The review is designed partly to allay concerns raised by activists who complain that voting software is open to manipulation by politically motivated computer experts, and that manufacturers haven't opened the software to public scrutiny that could help uncover such flaws.

Examinations of voting systems made by three other manufacturers are expected to begin in June and conclude by Aug. 3, giving counties at the end of the review process the legal minimum of six months before the Feb. 5 presidential primary to correct perceived problems with their systems' security or replace them with systems that Bowen approves.

Many counties across the United States have moved to touchscreens and other electronic voting systems in recent years after traditional punch-card ballots helped cause a weeks-long fiasco in the 2000 presidential election in Florida. But as electronic systems have become more common, so have suggestions that the machines can be rigged or the counting process hacked.

Election officials, (who in many cases have been wined, dined and "partnered" and "helped" to use those primitive systems that don't serve voters or election workers, but do serve the vendors and those beholden' to them,) lobbyists, and even politicians who lobbied for these e-systems and/or the few selected, highly insufficient vendors back in '03, as the Help America Vote Act was being pushed through Congress by Tom DeLay and Bob Ney (now both sentenced for other frauds,) under its euphemistic title; and who have followed, pushed or voted for these machines, for any number of reasons, some of which may even include just because they couldn't have known better in the short amount of time this legislation which spread these machines and vendors nationwide, had to be shoved through- even now, need to save face, or have become so boxed in - at times by the billions of taxpayer funds they've already spent on them, and/or "allegiances and partnerships" they've formed with vendors - keep trying to make us think e-voting and these vendors are the ONLY solutions.

Often this sector, rich with our taxpayer funds but little taxpayer influence, try to project their own political motivations on to anyone finally and actually doing governmentally-led valid tests on current electronic devices.

We thus hear that to authoritatively find and publish the expert facts about the systems is "political motivation," which doesn't even make any sense.

According to every independent expert academic, industrial and scientific test that has been done on these systems over the past 4 years, and despite these studies having been virtually blacked out of mainstream news - such future, clearly set out, scientifically and expertly done, independent fact finding, can only prove once again that Diebold, ES&S, Sequoia, etc need to be immediately removed from this nation's citizens elections.

Past independent expert findings that still few voters know about, (while they are asked if they "like" the colors on computer screens or pressing computer buttons,) have been so shocking and massive; have reached so far to the hidden cores of these systems which have never been independently studied (vendors claim we can't because of their proprietary ownership) or fixed; and which especially point so clearly, to how current e-voting devices allow those in power to undetectably and completely manipulate our vote results, (and track what and whom we are voting for) that any further tests on the same systems could prove no differently.

The California article shows the same dynamic that has been going on across the country, including Ohio for all these years. It states that:

Riverside County Supervisors Jeff Stone and John Tavaglione have suggested that they consider Bowen's review to be "politically motivated" and biased against the touch-screen computer systems that Riverside and 21 other counties use. Dunmore, Sequoia representatives and supervisors have often said that the Edge II terminals have been tested and certified by federal and California authorities.

The latter, unexplained "certification" argument is also the worn-out, unexplained catch-all paint, that to date, always neglects to mention what election-security activists have have been saying for years, and has just been proven with the decertification of the years-long "certifying" lab, Ciber - that that the federal and often previous state "testing labs", with few meaningful guidelines for security, accuracy and verifiability of our votes, have been both insufficient, or at least, beholden to the manufacturers, who pay for the tests.
And that is what has been providing the lofty "certification" supposed "seal of approval."

Since the planning of HAVA even before 2000, which spread current electronic voting systems made by politically friendly and profit-hungry vendors nationwide, the watchwords have not been sense, reason, facts nor verifiable proofs that these e-voting systems benefit the public, democratic elections or voters. Rather the "sense" of the arguments have only come from "following the money" and manipulation for growth of power.

The California article also states:

A leading Southwest County activist said he has a lot more faith in a group of experts that Bowen is putting together. Her office said Wednesday that it plans to hire 20 to 30 outside experts in election law and computer security to test the machines.

Nine whose names were released Wednesday include five university professors and Harri Hursti, a Finnish security entrepreneur who became something of a hero among voting activists after he discovered vulnerabilities in a touch-screen system made by a Sequoia competitor.

Hursti is one of three computer scientists hired so far to lead "red teams" who try to manipulate the machines' software to change the way it counts votes.

That group whom I understand is being gathered by Lowell Finley, formerly a lawyer known for standing for election integrity, and whom Bowen chose as her Assistant Secretary, sounds like it could be finally, a truly impressive and hopefully, independent expert group.

As stated in that previous post, since both Brunner and Bowen, both of whom ran and won primarily on election integrity platforms are planning the same kinds of tests, I certainly hope they gather and combine resources so every state can benefit from the finest testing that can be done. Hope for all and survival of our planet literally depend on real facts, not pure sales, financial, and political motivations dominating the cornerstone of democracy - our election process.

I therefore, look forward to learning the clear goals and processes of Ohio Secretary of State regarding our e-voting tests.

The Columbus Dispatch on Ohio Testing of E-Voting Devices

As has been so typical of mainstream media, losing reader- and listener-ship , thus worried about maintaining revenue, and because of lessened staff, nationwide governmental fear, or no longer caring to make the effort, doing little research, but just following the status quo power shifters - on May 10 the Columbus Dispatch published an editorial about Brunner's testing.
"Just Making Sure" began by stating " Retesting of Ohio's new voting devices likely will confirm accuracy;" along with the now typical mainstream media, broad-brush smear over national and international experts who have conducted and those who've read the research:

Ohio's new voting machines will be tested again, and the results likely will disappoint conspiracy theorists.

California's group of experts include many whose clear and unmistakable reports and conclusions, that the Dispatch's "conspiracy theorists/election integrity advocates, have taken to governmental leaders for years, trying to dissuade them from originally spending hundreds of millions of our dollars on these low quality, security- holed devices that can so easily sway our elections.

This was my reply to the Dispatch:

I too am "just making sure."(5/10/07.)

What scientific credentials – or information about lack of valid independent “experts” and/or goals for this summer’s Ohio testing of Ohio's voting devices - does your writer have, to know that these “likely will confirm accuracy”?

Every nationwide, expert independent study since 2004, not paid for or influenced by suddenly bloated, tax-paid, pockets of machine-makers and/or the politicians who love or fear them (or each other,) as happened during original "certification"; done by thorough experts including the GAO, and NIST; Johns Hopkins, Princeton, and Berkley Universities; Brennan Center, Hursti, ESI, RABA Technologies, individual states and more, all demonstrate with different approaches, but accumulating mounds of findings, that the electronic voting devices currently used in Ohio are unfit and dangerous for use in any democratic election. They together prove we have operationally and security-impossible, billion-dollar profit-makers for the few, which in many cases cause more far more work and expense than less, and have greatest benefit for insiders to easily, undetectably and completely change voters' “election results.”

The millions who’ve conducted and read the independent research, thus who already know that “liking” computer colors and buttons mean nothing, when the stakes are choosing the next president or council person in a process that has been widely recognized, even by our nation’s founders, as a likely target of power manipulation and abuse to be thoroughly avoided.

The 92% of Americans, who according to an 8/06 Zogby poll, want vote counting observable and open to public scrutiny, neither of which is possible inside our current "black boxes" with never-seen coding doing the "counting," also don’t fit your writer’s label of a "minority," nor of “conspiracy theorists.”

Maybe Ohioans should consider ourselves lucky to have such technical expertise right in your Dispatch offices. But intelligence and hope shows that we’d all be better off if you concentrated more on journalism - telling ALL the facts, than so blatantly and foolishly trying to misguide your readers.

Adele Eisner

It is vitally important that Ohio's e-voting device tests have clearly defined, thorough goals, and top-notch, highly-qualified independent computer, election-integrity, and design engineers experts to make an actually first and urgently needed, valid governmental testing effort in this state worthwhile - to democracy, to voters.

Will the Specious Circles About E-Voting, Avoiding Sense, Reason, Facts, Cost-Effiencies & Democracy Ever Stop?

Recently as increasing millions are waking up to the politically and financially hungry, but empty sales pitches we've had shoved down our throats about the glories of current e-voting systems, I've received a few emails from a few who are just finding and talking about Ohio's 'o3 -'05 "tests" done by J. Kenneth Blackwell - as he too was shoving - all 88 Ohio counties, with iron hand, and full speed ahead; offering manufacturers huge contracts for the entire state, with huge profits, but little to no liability for failures and damages to counties' elections; and offering little to no guidance to counties that had no information on which to choose a vendor, or better yet, to more wisely say NO!

Those emails have prompted me to to go back 2 1/2 years in my history with the CCBOE, when throughout '05, I was taking information to our board, who had made their unwavering decision to buy lots of Diebold in Feb. '04,

• when the public could have no idea of what they were doing (their agendas had one word entries like "HAVA" when no one knew what HAVA was, or "Vendors" again with no explanation);
• then attempted to bully, intimidate, gag and otherwise quiet away all activists and information brought to them that said they should not make the purchase;
• and finally, in the same month that the Center for Election Integrity held their one forum, "Election Reform", with only one panelist, Bob Ney (then inches from indictment and now convicted for fraud, and one of HAVA's main authors that spread the electronic systems made by essentially 2 main vendors into every county across the nation,)
• on 11/11/05, in a non-announced, non-public gathering, the then-board signed Cuyahoga's purchase order that started the slipping away of 10's of millions of taxpayer dollars - for more work, no public verifiability, secret vote counting, the ability to have insiders undetectably manipulate our vote results, and more.

Since those old Blackwell tests have again worked their way into public light, and now to a much wider audience, it seems wise to revisit here, just a few of the '05 statements I made (in vain then) to our now-previous board.
(I will upload and link all documents mentioned as I have time.)

I begin with a paraphrase of an email I recently sent to some colleagues in SoS Brunner's Voting Rights Institute, her visionary action to each year bring new groups of activists and advocates, election officials, party officials, together to work toward the common purpose of finally reforming Ohio's elections. While the Institute and its constituents is public information, the only reason I paraphrase is that I've not asked permission of the one sender whom I address a couple of times, to use his name. All else is whole.

One poster said:

In my opinion, it is very important that we distinguish between
1) testing one or two machines in a controlled environment as was done 2003, 2004, & 2005 and
2) testing the machines in a realistic situation.

I replied:

I too am eager to know clearly what the stated GOALS are for this state testing.
Until such a thorough plan about what is being tested, and for what, I don't think any testing can or should begin.

Yours are excellent points.

At least in the case of the Diebold machines, which I followed, while parallel CompuWare reports were coming out about ES&S, BOTH kinds of tests are necessary to do any kind of valid review of DREs, because:

1. Even the problems/risks found in the '03-'05 CompuWare studies, paid for by Diebold, with only the 11/03 study included as addendum to Ohio's Master contract indicating they would be satisfied - HAVE NEVER BEEN SATISFIED.
Mr. Blackwell, then as the "master' of the state '04 and '05 Master Contract (as he distributed and controlled HAVA funds) and with all county contracts and agreements needing to serve and go through his Master Contract ( a rather "strange" awkward, and almost powerless contractual arrangement for counties )- never insisted that the problems CompuWare found in '03 were fixed.

And many of those were NOT, even by 4/05 -the last of the 4 reports, or since.
Even the problems CompuWare highlighted were minimal, as pointed out by other states relying on Ohio's commissioned CompuWare studies, because CompuWare was both being paid by the vendors to help them make sales, while as a lab with their own liability, CompuWare needed to point out at least, the most glaring issues.
(And as you know, Ciber, which did the federal "certification" has just recently been decertified themselves for their poor practices and what they overlooked, as they too were paid by the vendors.)

2. As you point out, we have also now found through usage, that there are also many additional operational and security obstructions/problems that the Diebold machines also present, such as:
• soaring cost of poll worker training, with still too complicated and impossibility of properly running machines under a normal load -
• printers jamming;
• Voter Access Cards stopping after being handled 50 or more times,
• legs crashing;
• "tamper tape" left to impossibly "protect" our votes on removable memory cards, unable to really protect or easily show when tampering has occurred;
• small memory on GEMS server necessitating hours more work to batch and feed according to machine limitations; and GEMS inability to handle more than one operation at a time, vastly slowing down and adding work to massive tasks
• inflexible reporting - and data bases unable to "talk to one another"
• impossibility of proper L&A tests to be completed on every machine, which is necessary, just because of the sheer amount of months and personnel it would take to do so - so we use, in effect, worthless tests - to say we've done them.
• and on, and on, and on.....

What amazes me over and over again, is how nationwide, by having been led down and boxed into these few, in effect, totally insufficient, horrible computer options for voting, by a few serving a few select vendors, so that now, we keep going round and round in the same insufficient, horrible and growing circles - writing reports about the problems, that have basically been added to, not diminished over time, and the core of which have no answers other than to rid ourselves of those vendors, and start again with excellent computer designers, starting with our real election needs.

We end up buying into that the only way to solve these problems is by buying more layers and equipment from the same vendors who caused the problems in the first place, by providing insufficient, poor equipment and services, lowest cost and effort/highest profit for themselves. We even end up arguing about Holt, and unfunded mandates for the same useless and dangerous reasons.

I include here, a copy of an email I sent to then Cuyahoga board member Ed Coaxum in October, 2005, trying to dissuade Cuyahoga from buying Diebold when they did.

The biggest problem is, is this 2-year old email is still relevant! What is mentioned here, is a core of what the Princeton Report found at the end of 2006! And nothing has essentially changed since the Princeton report, other than more problems have occurred and been found, and millions more have been spent.

This is the statement I orally summarized and submitted to the record in writing at the 10/24/05 CCBOE board meeting the week after their supposed public hearing, where still the public had no access to Blackwell's Master Contract and the entire morning had been one long Diebold sales pitch, while the almost 100 in the audience who came almost unanimously to speak against the machine purchase, had 3 afternoon hours, to fit in about 9, 5-minute speakers (and while the board reserved the right to answer NO questions.) The following statement also reveals how fewe answers the year-long asking public had gotten - until the two days before "the hearing" when they suddenly but progressively put onto their website more than 800 pages of documents, not all immediately relevant - another form of stonewalling.

To: The Cuyahoga County Board of Elections - For The 10/24/05 Meeting
From: Adele Eisner

On October 21, 2005, the Government Accountability Office released its study, "Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed", GAO-05-956. Unlike Diebold's paid Joe Andrew at your last meeting, this report, which was conducted in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards during the first 8 months of this year and which included a widely diverse range of governmental and non-governmental reports and interviews, including the EAC, and NIST, states clearly that security is NOT the last and most minor issue to be considered with deployment of these black box machines determining election outcomes.

Vastly incompletely dealt-with security and reliability issues are THE ABSOLUTE priority issue. This report also affirms that security is THE issue on the minds of the vast number of people who have been standing nationwide against these DRE’s, knowing that methods and protocols have not yet been developed to allow public validation of what goes on behind closed doors and inside computers that are rampant with undetectable opportunities to easily manipulate election results - with unprecedented ease, and in wholesale quantities.

On page 22, the GAO report briefly reiterates its essence:
“Electronic voting systems hold promise for improving the efficiency and accuracy of the election process by automating a manual process, providing flexibility for accommodating voters with special needs, and implementing controls to avoid errors by voters and election workers. However, in a series of recent reports, election officials, computer security experts, citizen advocacy groups, and others have raised significant concerns about the security and reliability of electronic voting systems, citing instances of weak security controls, system design flaws, inadequate system version control, inadequate security testing, incorrect system configuration, poor security management, and vague or incomplete standards, among other issues.”
It continues later: ” In light of the recently demonstrated voting system problems; the differing views on how widespread these problems are; and the complexity of assuring the accuracy, integrity, confidentiality, and availability of voting systems throughout their life cycles, the security and reliability concerns raised in recent reports merit the focused attention of federal, state, and local authorities responsible for election administration.”

The report deals with everything from

• a publicly transparent procurement process,
• election administrators rigorously conducting their own protocol, not the vendor’s, for testing of each machine with each ballot style,
• to demanding background checks of software developers and vendor personnel- none of which is has been demanded in Ohio.
  

The citizens of Cuyahoga County have overriding our proposed purchase, instead,

• a highly partisan Secretary of State with future designs for his own advancement;
• demanding his boards of elections serve at his pleasure;
• having Diebold help him put online his obfuscating plan, which also allows himself be the ultimate hearing adjudicator for voter complaints;
• having Diebold help him create training videos with him and his own message included – just in time for his governor’s race;
• signing a contract that gives him the right to arbitrarily accept Diebold’s mere explanations of patches, certifications, or lack thereof;
• allows him to arbitrarily tell Diebold to do things that are not written in the contract, thus are not publicly seen;
• and allows him to stress a kind of confidentiality between the Secretary and Diebold that predicts litigation by citizens.

And we have a contract looming that has Diebold

• basically designing the initial testing of our machines which is to be completed during the first 30 days of “dog and pony show”, to assure our “acceptance” – ie.
• designing our proof that their machines and contents are all exactly alike, that they work accurately with all ballot styles, to prove their own security;
• and a contract that only demands of Diebold personnel who have made our software and will be the only ones inside our machines for at least five years with our “wonderful warranty”, that they

not be illegal aliens,

that Diebold pays their benefits and insurances,

and Diebold says they know what they are doing. The heck with Diebold’s history of hiring and promoting ex-felons, charged with fraudulent computer coding, or others with difficulty finding jobs.

Further a 2004 California Task Force on DRE’s states:

…the Compuware analysis of the four voting systems is not as critically rigorous as that employed by as Hopkins and RABA authors. The Compuware report does not characterize any vulnerability characterized as “high risk,” as being due to poor design, or based on the failure of the system designer to understand security principles adequately. Finally, the report appears to give no serious consideration to recommending that one or more of the systems might not be ready for deployment, rather than proposing ways to minimize the risks it did identify.

And the authors of the highly regarded RABA report referred to, which was commissioned by the state of Maryland after Compuware and SAIC, to evaluate Hopkins and SAIC, and the Diebold AccuVote TS system itself, were critical of Diebold’s security architecture. This company whose principals work with the National Security Agency, concluded that Diebold’s software could not be brought to the level of “best practice security” just by upgrading it, or fixing a specific list of identified problems. They said:

“It is our opinion that the current DIEBOLD software reflects a layered approach to security: as objections are raised additional layers are added. True security can only come via established security models, trust models, and software engineering processes that follow these models; we feel that a pervasive code rewrite would be necessary to instantiate the level of best practice security necessary to eliminate the risks we have outlined in the previous sections. Our analysis lacked the time and resources to determine if DIEBOLD has the expertise to accomplish this task.”

With these “drop in the bucket” examples, please do not again offer your overused, but non-valid replies that "no election is perfect", and/or "this is an evolving process”.
As you well know, no one is asking for perfection, only for reasonable security as set out by non-vested experts and for the public’s ability to reasonably be able to check those who handle the many yet unresolved security issues.

As to "evolution", obviously a computer purchase used to determine one-chance election outcomes affecting this planet’s future, is nothing like an individual or business who says “OK, we'll just buy this computer and upgrade as things get better.”
The 2006 elections, as HAVA well predicts are important, though its late starting EAC has only provided for voluntary and scant security guidelines for electronic voting by that date.

BEFORE ANY election is held on computers – and BEFORE millions of taxpayer dollars are spent on thousands of them, thus, concretizing the death knell to secure elections in this county too - whether the dollars come from the federal, state or county level, it’s up to YOU to serve the this county’s public’s interest in preserving our last vestiges of democracy and fair elections.

And should you decide not to do the right thing by continuing on your “roadmap to electronic voting”, I have a few questions regarding security:

1. John Washburn, the Wisconson computer expert in election systems and security, including LAT testing, traveled here to attend last week’s meeting. In the 5 minutes you allowed him, he handed this Board a full written report about LAT testing and machine pretesting, which I hope you’ve read and considered more seriously than procedures outlined from the company vested in its own machine’s rightness. His report and other experts in this field determine that to truly demonstrate all of 6,000+ machines’ logic and accuracy, lack of bugs, etc. this procedure, with even testing only 200 ballot definitions, would take a few years for 6 people to complete in 10-hour days, at a low estimate of 2 minutes per test. And this must be done and audited, before the public. Please describe your initial machine testing on each machine, that the SoS plan shows you will be doing in 30 days to provide assured acceptance, and your LAT testing procedures.
2. Please describe how and where you will store and seal these machines, once tested before and between elections.
3. Please describe how provisional ballots will be handled at the polls with these machines, what a voter will need to do, what a poll worker will need to do, and how provisionals will be validated.
4. Since signatures can change vastly over years, as mine has, please describe how you have updated your signatures on registration files, which for one thing may be used to verify provisional ballots.
5. Please clearly describe the process of publicly witnessed recounts with these cash register-like paper trails.
6. Please describe how, and how long you will preserve these paper rolls securely.
7. Please describe how you will supervise Diebold personnel, the standards you will use to hire or fire them, and how they will be audited as they have access to the coding of your machines.
8. Where will the public be allowed to view the central tabulator’s election night counting?
9. And last – a moment of silence for the death of fair elections, ironically played as a knee-jerk reaction to the Florida election debacle – which even then had less to do with chads, and far more to do with unethical Secretaries of State and political theft. Same story then as now, but primitive efforts and results compared to what now can come - even to Cuyahoga County - with your help.

The following was my 10/25/05 follow-up email to Ed Coaxum, who at least listened and asked questions about the documents I was mentioning:
10/25/05

Dear Ed,

To facilitate your locating the reports I referred to at yesterday's Board Meeting, I will attach them by email to you. I will also forward the URL of the 10/21/05 GAO Report, "Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed", GAO-05-956.

I truly appreciate your serious and excellent consideration of this very serious matter.

To be sent:

1. California "Final" Report - Re: March, 2004 - which I quoted about CompuWare studies on Diebold, based opn their own direct experience, since CompuWare studies have also served as the main bases of security/reliability for Ohio's purchases.

2. The Maryland RABA Technologies Report, dated January, 2004 also known as the "Trusted Agent Report"

Though the above two reports were done before the implementation of VVPAT, and thus, direct much attention to the necessity of having voter verified paper trails, you will also see that both reports also clearly demonstrate that even properly done, VVPAT alone, is only a necessary minimum, and only a beginning to necessary election security.

The California study speaks articulately, and from that state's own direct experience, about the insufficiency of CompuWare studies (the ones used as main bases for the Ohio's Diebold purchase) to validly demonstrate Diebold's sufficiency for secure and reliable election deployment.
RABA speaks to Diebold's “lack of mature and systemic understanding of coding and security to achieve even minimum best practices levels.”

At the 10/24 BOE meeting I quoted RABA, via quotes in the California study. That was one of only 2 RABA entries that California included in their report from their Diebold experience, as they saw those points critical to emphasize.

The RABA quote can be found on page 23 of their full report, but I urge you to begin reading there at least at page 17 where RABA begins it's assessment of Diebold's previous DRE model - the Accuvote TS. The picture is far from "pretty".

The report also makes it clear that this highly regarded company, RABA, had nothing to gain or lose from being honest. Yes, they were being paid by the state of Maryland, but in this case, all that Maryland was paying for was a non-vested, highly expert opinion - not affirmation to make a sale, nor to push any preconceived agenda.

The California quote I used can be found on page 27 of that study:
" The Compuware report does not characterize any vulnerability characterized as “high risk,” as being due to poor design, or based on the failure of the system designer to understand security principles adequately. Finally, the {Compuware} report appears to give no serious consideration to recommending that one or more of the systems might not be ready for deployment, rather than proposing ways to minimize the risks it did identify."

I also urge you, if time precludes a full reading of the California report, to begin on page 21, Section IV. The section is titled Security. And then read to the end. It presents a very clear picture.


The RABA quote I used was:
“It is our opinion that the current DIEBOLD software reflects a layered approach to security: as objections are raised additional layers are added. True security can only come via established security models, trust models, and software engineering processes that follow these models; we feel that a pervasive code rewrite would be necessary to instantiate the level of best practice security necessary to eliminate the risks we have outlined in the previous sections. Our analysis lacked the time and resources to determine if DIEBOLD has the expertise to accomplish this task.”

As stated above, it is on page 23, and here, I urge you to at least begin reading at page 17, the assessment of the Accuvote, through the end (page 25.)


3. To demonstrate the above 2 points, I will also send you three successive CompuWare studies, 8/18/04; 1/26/05; and 4/15/05 as commissioned by our own SoS. Though they are linked to his website, I found them difficult to discover, if one does not go beyond the first layer of pages via guessed links, so I was not sure you were aware of them.

I will not, however, send the first CompuWare assessment, the one dated 11/21/03, as it is linked to the CCBOE website.
However, only portions of the first CompuWare study, the 11/03 assessment, are even addressed in the Master Contract. They can be found in Schedule C, Attachment A, "Diebold Risk Mitigation Plan", starting I believe, on page 49 of the Contract. I don't believe that "Mitigation" is mentioned at all, in the later contract addendum.

In the Master Contract, all that was contractually required of Diebold regarding such "risk mitigation", was that they respond to a portion of the list of risks that CompuWare had identified in 11/03. Diebold thus, copied a portion of the Compuware list, along with CompuWare's mitgation recommendations, and then added a column for Diebold responses. In the majority of those replies, Diebold just repeated the same two things:

1.that they had instituted a Key Card Tool for changing of authorized PINs - which they stated fixed a number of things - but which fix was identified by Compuware later - in the 8/04 report as a new and different risk, and which Compuware identified as a risk again in 4/05 - because Diebold had not changed it/ the last CompuWare recommendations had not been implemented. One would only know that however, by looking at each report.

2. Secondly regarding Diebold's contract mitigation statements -
Diebold paraphrased over and over in their Contract risk mitigation section, just what CompuWare recommended far too often for very serious hardware/software security risks that could massively change an entire election outcome. Diebold repeated: "We agree that administrative policies and procedures are an important part of a well run election and should be used to enhance security whenever possible."

You may note for yourself that CompuWare risk mitigation recommendations - as also pointed out by California, and by RABA - concerning major computer risks for huge-scale, and hard to detect election tampering by insiders is unreasonably and too frequently addressed by CompuWare as.... "administrative policies and procedures must be put in place...."

Many point out that certainly regular election security policies must be adhered to. But as RABA points out, when considering huge scale election risks, for people to rely so heavily on "administrative policies and procedures" - which all know may not be adhered to evenly among all election workers, and certainly not among all election day workers, one has to be both very foolish and very unwise.

The rest of Diebold's Master Contract mitigation replies consisted again of their own similar explanations of rightness, with NO expert counterpoint even demanded.

In the three later CompuWare assessments I will send, you will also note, for instance, that just as RABA had predicted, Diebold did not seem to know how to truly fix security concerns.

For in 1/05 they had added another "layer", another off the shelf security measure, Digital Guardian, for some detection of tampering and other preventions, but did not know how to configure this highly sophisticated tool, thus causing, again, more and different wholesale security risks.
By the next and last assessment I found, the one dated 4/05, though Diebold had then changed some things about Digital Guardian, they had again caused still more problems, while still not preventing Guardian from being uninstalled, or turned off.

This pattern repeats over and over, in many different ways, from one assessment to the next - with non-implemented recommendations and with exchanging one risk for another, sometimes worse, - all risks still too great.

Also, two of the three reports, stresssed that Diebold bring it's programming understanding up to CM2 engineering levels by the end of 2005, then quickly to CM3. Even InfoSENTRY referred to below talked about the need for Diebold to make it's programming more "mature" and up to these basic professional levels.

And even the last Compuware report, 4/05 still has many supposed mitigations still needed - along with high quality checks of them, I might add.

Though you may feel that a thorough look at these 3 last CompuWare studies is warranted, if time does not allow, much can be gleaned from just comparing the progression of risk/threat asssessments sections. Those sections begin approximately at the following pages:
8/18/04 - page 58
1/26/05 - page 17
4/15/05 - page 42


4. Next to the last, I will send 2 more documents from the SoS website:
a. the InfoSENTRY Report, also commissioned by the Ohio SoS, which was interestingly released the same date as the first CompuWare study, 11/21/03. The second half of its 46 pages is comprised of an iteration of what they term "Principle HAVA Security Sections".

InfoSENTRY continually points out the SoS great efforts, and the foolish need for speed. For instance, page 25:
"Ohio’s Secretary of State has undertaken an aggressive program to assess voting system security, including the condition of vendor’s hardware, software, and data transfers. The Security Assessment points up that no system can be truly secure until the plans, policies, and procedures of all of the voting system supply chain links are made stronger. The Security Assessment found no “show stopper” {their bold and underline} to indicate that the introduction of computerized voting systems in Ohio should be slowed or stopped solely because of security concerns. The Security Assessment found that Ohio’s election officials and the vendors who supply them with these systems must take many important mitigating steps in the near future to remedy security problems that do exist. "

They cover their own very risky statement at the end ..."must take many important mitigating steps" which is what Compuware always did too. And though they may have just been trying to sound flip, an election - at least a fair one - is NOT in any way comparable to a "show".

b. And the SoS's “Detailed Gap Analysis Findings” - prepared by his own office, dated February 26, 2004, and which is basically a reply to RABA. It states

"...our gap analysis found nothing of substance that had not already been identified by Compuware, InfoSENTRY, or SAIC, documented, acted upon, and presented to the vendors as recommended changes. For details of the gap analysis, refer to section “Detailed Gap Analysis Findings” on the next page. As stated in the Ohio study, { InfoSENTRY} “The Security Assessment found no ‘show stopper’ to indicate that the introduction of computerized voting systems in Ohio should be slowed or stopped solely because of security concerns.” The Ohio study found that the DRE systems could be deployed as scheduled, provided the vendors take necessary mitigating steps."

(And I add... if they say the vendors need to take mitigating steps, and the vendors and CompuWare state what’s needed are "election official administrative policies and procedures..." this sounds like a bit of buck-passing back and forth to me, with no one being held accountable.)

5. And last, I will send you the body of the email I received regarding the GAO Report, "Federal Efforts to Improve Security and Reliability of Electronic Voting Systems Are Under Way, but Key Activities Need to Be Completed", GAO-05-956, released on 10/21. It contains the URL for the full report.

Again, I apologize for the length of this email, and the number of emails to come. This seems, however, necessary to get a more valid picture from the information that has been released since last week.

I very much appreciate your consideration of this matter.

Adele Eisner