Some have approached me wanting to check out the "paper trail" from Diebold DREs. These, "our official ballots", each one possibly holding up to 300-500 voters' "official ballots" do not print in whole, or are otherwise illegible, approximately 10% of the time, as was proved by July's ESI Report, and re-demonstrated again recently.
We do not need a re-demonstration again but a method of assuring that each voter gets an official ballot, as long as we're forced into using these unreliable and completely non-transparent DREs, that have been proved riggable, also by ESI and many computer experts.
Also, Board of Elections workers in every county using these unreliable printers, need exact instructions of how to get an official ballot for every voter. According to law, and previous Attorney General opinions, the "official ballot" is "the "voter verfIED" "paper trail."
Once it is found that the machine has eaten it, crushed it, not printed it, etc., it is too late. What are citizens to do? Certainly not blanketly allow people inside a board to possibly pick out the wrong memory card, or the wrong data base, or even the wrong machine, to without the voters' supervision, supposedly "recreate" hundreds of official ballots at a time.
Voters, board workers, elections need a far clearer method of getting our official ballots. And this, just one of numerous problems with Diebold DREs, does not seem possible with them.
In fact, their lack of reliability, along with legs crashing, screens freezing, votes being switched by the machine, termed "a calibration problem," and the software that's counting never having been seen by any truly independent expert, let alone by us, all are just a few of the (more minor) reasons that these machines do not belong in any citizens' election. There are many others.
Some nationwide election integrity activists are studying some of these other reasons these machines do not belong in our elections.
I post a beginning sample of "official ballots" from one Beachwood (suburb) precinct. (There are other precincts in Beachwood.)
With a Public Information Request to the Cuyahoha elections board, and the truly wonderful cooperation of Interim Director, Jane Platten, working with a staff who now feels supported, and thus, free to cooperate well with citizens, I got hundreds of pages of such copies - each "ballot" from one precinct, and each taking two pages. I have not yet counted how many ballots I have.
Here are the first 25.
They are numbered 1a, 1b; 2a, 2b, etc. The number being the ballot number in order of my scanning, the a - the first page of that ballot; the b - the second page.
These are in jpeg format.
For those studying, I did not want to reduce, combine, omit, etc. for I know it might be important to see these ballots in their original form, with all original choices, and as copied.
I have absolutely NO reason believe that the copies are anything but accurate representations of the originals, with only the limits of copying machine capabilities, now scanner capabilities, intervening.
Hope this helps those of you in WA and NH, etc.
By right-clicking on each choice, you'll find the pages downloadable.
http://www.box.net/shared/va6liy
mh0s
Next 20 ballots
http://www.box.net/shared/h4ku3vabsh
Showing posts with label election processes. Show all posts
Showing posts with label election processes. Show all posts
Sunday, April 29, 2007
Thursday, March 29, 2007
Dangerous Irony: Proofing Paper Ballots in an Electronic World
Yesterday, I posted the CCBOE media release inviting citizens, by Ohio law, for today's 24 hour proofing period of the ballots for the next, May's election. Late this afternoon I went.
I, like most board employees and managers I observed during the chaos of scanning the absentee ballots last November, got dazed by the enormity of the poorly set out task and the confusion and forgot the ultimate purpose of why I was there - to PROOF ballots that are to be used in the next election to make sure they are correct.
It was not until I got home that I realized the irony - the really dangerous irony - of having citizens review and proof paper ballots in an effort to facilitate transparency, when in Cuyahoga voting is done on a $20+ million electronic system.
Just as with any Microsoft Word document we create, we all know that there is lots of computer code that exists within the document - codes that create the formatting styles, the fonts, the colors, the tab widths, paragraphs, etc. - but this code is not revealed on a print out of the document.
There is the same kind of code inside the electronic ballots {Ballot Definition File (BDF)}, that we use when we vote on a touchscreen voting system. And that code inside the BDF, if improperly configured - negligently, incompetently, or purposefully - could possibly affect election results, as was investigated in Florida's 2006 HR13 election (Congressional race) where an unusually high number of undervotes were discovered.
In addition to all the other major factors that demand we must get rid of electronics in citizen elections, such as soaring costs; multi-vector security holes that also easily allow insider riggability and anyone's hackability; the operational unreliability; and counting secrecy - now to truly be able to proof our ballots, we need to get digital copies of all the ballot styles, which in Cuyahoga countywide elections can number up to 1400, and which show the underneath codes. Then we need independent computer experts, along with regular English text proofreaders, and those familiar with the candidates and issues to do the proofing together.
As long as we have DRE's, which I hope is not long at all, no less is sufficient.
I, like most board employees and managers I observed during the chaos of scanning the absentee ballots last November, got dazed by the enormity of the poorly set out task and the confusion and forgot the ultimate purpose of why I was there - to PROOF ballots that are to be used in the next election to make sure they are correct.
It was not until I got home that I realized the irony - the really dangerous irony - of having citizens review and proof paper ballots in an effort to facilitate transparency, when in Cuyahoga voting is done on a $20+ million electronic system.
Just as with any Microsoft Word document we create, we all know that there is lots of computer code that exists within the document - codes that create the formatting styles, the fonts, the colors, the tab widths, paragraphs, etc. - but this code is not revealed on a print out of the document.
There is the same kind of code inside the electronic ballots {Ballot Definition File (BDF)}, that we use when we vote on a touchscreen voting system. And that code inside the BDF, if improperly configured - negligently, incompetently, or purposefully - could possibly affect election results, as was investigated in Florida's 2006 HR13 election (Congressional race) where an unusually high number of undervotes were discovered.
In addition to all the other major factors that demand we must get rid of electronics in citizen elections, such as soaring costs; multi-vector security holes that also easily allow insider riggability and anyone's hackability; the operational unreliability; and counting secrecy - now to truly be able to proof our ballots, we need to get digital copies of all the ballot styles, which in Cuyahoga countywide elections can number up to 1400, and which show the underneath codes. Then we need independent computer experts, along with regular English text proofreaders, and those familiar with the candidates and issues to do the proofing together.
As long as we have DRE's, which I hope is not long at all, no less is sufficient.
Ballot "Proofing" at the CCBOE
Yesterday, I posted the CCBOE media release
With no BOE help available, and no signage for this "public event", the lovely camera woman who was there from Ohio News Network to follow the story of how many people showed up for the proofing, had to point me to the specific pile she had seen the one other person who had come directed to. Cheryl Ellis, the Community Outreach woman whose name was on the media release for information, saw me and waved and left the building shortly after I walked in. Two others disappeared into the Community Outreach office.
I sat down to plow my way through to "proof" to find the approximate first 200 sheets, all of the Democratic Primary for the Clerk of Rocky River Court, with what appeared to be the exact same ballot, just with the two candidate's names alternating first position, and the indecipherable, but changing "BOE-speak" versioning code at the top.
Most citizens choosing to come to proof, to take advantage of this right, but not familiar with the BOE, would not have even recognized that alternating candidate positioning as the position rotation per precinct, as demanded by Ohio law.
Most would have had to give up right there. Some in that situation, might have also mistakenly ascribed their lack of understanding to themselves, and walked away, saying everything was good.
Having enough CCBOE experience to know this was typical and know it was not my lack, I asked again for help. Another in Community Outreach said she couldn't help. She didn't know about the ballots.The lovely camera woman then pointed me to a woman who was picking up other papers from the other end of the table, telling me that she was the woman who had helped the man who had come to proof earlier.
When I asked that "helper" however, she said she couldn't help me, because she didn't know about the ballots. We were being filmed.
ONN's watching reporter, Brian McIntyre went into the Community Outreach office to get the last person there, who said he didn't know either, but he went to get Matt, the head of the Ballot Department.
By the time Matt arrived, I had found the small precinct codes, again indecipherable to the unfamiliar, but which allowed me to be able to figure out basically what I was looking at.
Matt came and explained that, yes, Rocky River Courts should have 143 or 149 precincts, (I don't remember,) thus the same number of pieces of paper. There were far more Rocky River sheets than 149, however. It was getting late, I didn't count. In retrospect, and had I the time, I should have. It is these small details reflective of much larger systemic problems that capture the board's attention, while they deny the broader view.
I checked a few of the similarly repeated issue papers, like the Independence levy.
But I never really proofed anything. It was impossible. Even had the pile been easily found and understood, four to five hundred sheets of anything is far from a any citizen, "stop-in" PROOFING situation.
I did ask Matt if his department had proofed. He said, especially after last election, yes they had. They had a team of whiz-bang temps go over the ballots carefully. They had found many mistakes on the first round, and after about four rounds and finally moved commas, etc. thought they were right.
I didn't even ask how they got all the ballots that were supposed to be the same, the same; ie. if they had to proof each one of the approximate 500 ballot styles individually, or if they had made global changes as each change was found necessary.
At the CCBOE, having to change each one individually is still a strong possibility. Adapting to their being paid to work for citizens, for accurate, fair, transparent elections for citizen's elections, not just or the sake of getting a CCBOE task done for the CCBOE seems still a foreign concept.
With no BOE help available, and no signage for this "public event", the lovely camera woman who was there from Ohio News Network to follow the story of how many people showed up for the proofing, had to point me to the specific pile she had seen the one other person who had come directed to. Cheryl Ellis, the Community Outreach woman whose name was on the media release for information, saw me and waved and left the building shortly after I walked in. Two others disappeared into the Community Outreach office.
I sat down to plow my way through to "proof" to find the approximate first 200 sheets, all of the Democratic Primary for the Clerk of Rocky River Court, with what appeared to be the exact same ballot, just with the two candidate's names alternating first position, and the indecipherable, but changing "BOE-speak" versioning code at the top.
Most citizens choosing to come to proof, to take advantage of this right, but not familiar with the BOE, would not have even recognized that alternating candidate positioning as the position rotation per precinct, as demanded by Ohio law.
Most would have had to give up right there. Some in that situation, might have also mistakenly ascribed their lack of understanding to themselves, and walked away, saying everything was good.
Having enough CCBOE experience to know this was typical and know it was not my lack, I asked again for help. Another in Community Outreach said she couldn't help. She didn't know about the ballots.The lovely camera woman then pointed me to a woman who was picking up other papers from the other end of the table, telling me that she was the woman who had helped the man who had come to proof earlier.
When I asked that "helper" however, she said she couldn't help me, because she didn't know about the ballots. We were being filmed.
ONN's watching reporter, Brian McIntyre went into the Community Outreach office to get the last person there, who said he didn't know either, but he went to get Matt, the head of the Ballot Department.
By the time Matt arrived, I had found the small precinct codes, again indecipherable to the unfamiliar, but which allowed me to be able to figure out basically what I was looking at.
Matt came and explained that, yes, Rocky River Courts should have 143 or 149 precincts, (I don't remember,) thus the same number of pieces of paper. There were far more Rocky River sheets than 149, however. It was getting late, I didn't count. In retrospect, and had I the time, I should have. It is these small details reflective of much larger systemic problems that capture the board's attention, while they deny the broader view.
I checked a few of the similarly repeated issue papers, like the Independence levy.
But I never really proofed anything. It was impossible. Even had the pile been easily found and understood, four to five hundred sheets of anything is far from a any citizen, "stop-in" PROOFING situation.
I did ask Matt if his department had proofed. He said, especially after last election, yes they had. They had a team of whiz-bang temps go over the ballots carefully. They had found many mistakes on the first round, and after about four rounds and finally moved commas, etc. thought they were right.
I didn't even ask how they got all the ballots that were supposed to be the same, the same; ie. if they had to proof each one of the approximate 500 ballot styles individually, or if they had made global changes as each change was found necessary.
At the CCBOE, having to change each one individually is still a strong possibility. Adapting to their being paid to work for citizens, for accurate, fair, transparent elections for citizen's elections, not just or the sake of getting a CCBOE task done for the CCBOE seems still a foreign concept.
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